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Some authorities from the antebellum period to the 
present have located the source of the American law of 
slavery in continental civil law codes and hence in 
Roman slave law. They have been unable or unwilling 
to connect the brutal system of institutionalized racial 
slavery that emerged in Virginia and elsewhere in the 
American slave kingdom with what they have per­
ceived as an open, freedom-favoring Anglo-American 
legal system and have thus ought an explanation of its 
legal underpinnings in other jurisdictical standards. 
Both the absence of chattel slavery in Engli h law and 
the common law's laimed bias in favor of liberty have 
often been cit d as reasons why it is impossible that 
English law could be the source of such an abomina­
tion.1 
The slave law that develop d in seventeenth century Virginia fits 
squarely within the broad Engli h legal tradition, however. The 
common law repre nts only one asp ct of that tradition, which 
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also includes equity, ecclesiastical courts, and, most important in 
this context, the less formal conciliar law used to govern areas on 
the edge of England, such as Wales, the Marches, and Ireland. 
Upon study of the early decisions of the Virginia Council sitting 
as a judicial court, it becomes apparent that the swift, summary 
justice of these outlying councils was a clear and direct 
antecedent of the system of justice that sanctioned racial slavery 
in Virginia. Once the early Virginia Council had helped impose 
slavery, the maturing legal system could then use the common 
law as a tool to regulate it. 
Slavery and the Law in Virginia before 1670 
Prior to the 1660s the Virginia legal system oscillated between 
tacit recognition of the relative equality of Blacks and an avowed 
declaration of their inferiority. The earliest law of slavery in 
Virginia served to cut off routes of escape to freedom for a peo­
ple already enslaved through custom. This law developed in an 
atmosphere of unconstrained legal authority and in response to 
compelling economic and cultural circumstances. Its legal 
underpinnings were firmly rooted in English legal and political 
traditions. There was no legal declaration that Africans were to 
be slaves, but rather a series of cases, followed by legislation, 
that dealt with the practical problems arising from the custom of 
holding Africans as slaves.2 The effect of these laws and deci­
sions was to make it increasingly difficult for Blacks to be any­
thing but slaves. The paths of escape from this condition were 
gradually narrowed until choked off nearly altogether. 
This early Virginian slave law came about to clear up ambi­
guities in customary practice. Custom and law recognized the 
existence of property interests in people. Black labor was treat­
ed differently from its white counterpart almost from its begin­
ning in Virginia. The legal basis of white service was contract. 
Ordinarily white laborers had indentures that specified that their 
labor would be the property of their master for a particular peri­
od of time. Most Africans, however, having arrived as involun­
tary immigrants, were not parties to any contract limiting their 
term of service nor were their services regulated by the law. 
Moreover statutory provisions that limited the terms of service for 
white laborers who arrived in Virginia without indentures were 
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not used to similarly protect Africans, who could thus be held for 
life.3 The customary practice of holding black servants for a term 
of life began the legal process of converting people, who pos­
sessed both rights and duties, into chattel property. Not all 
Africans who entered Virginia in the early 1600s were held for 
life. Some enjoyed a measure of freedom. Some were treated as 
indentured servants and released when their term was over. 
More gained their freedom through manumission.4 The case of 
Anthony Johnson, a free Black who claimed headrights for 
Africans he imported himself, illustrates the lack of uniformity in 
the status of Blacks in the early decades of their presence.s Legal 
records from the first half of the century reveal instances of 
Blacks who earned wages and bought land and of black males 
testifying in trials of white men. 
Still, even though there was some degree of fluidity in their 
status in the early decades, Blacks, without the protection of 
written contracts or statutory provisions, were uniquely vulnera­
ble. The early case law suggests that their vulnerability was 
quickly exploited. The legal dehumanization of black Virginians 
was aided by a series of decisions handed down by the General 
Court beginning in the 1620s. These cases make it clear that 
black labor was treated differently from white, and validate and 
regulate many of the elements of this customary difference. 
The earliest reported cases involving Blacks are quite brief 
and are not especially revealing about their status or circum­
stances. This ambiguity can be seen in cases of the mid-1620s. 
"John Phillip, a Negro Christened in England," testified in the 
1624 debt trial of Symon Tuchinge, a white man. Phillip seem­
ingly was permitted to testify because he was a Christian.6 The 
following year, 1625, in a case involving a black man named 
Brase, the court ordered that "the negro yt cam in with Capt 
Jones" serve Lady Yeardley until further order but granted him 
what amounted to wages for his service.7 The next month the 
court ordered that this same man, "ye negro called by the name 
of brase shall belonge to Sr ffrancis Wyatt Gournor &c., as his 
servant" despite Captain Jones 1 alleged sale of him to another 
man.a 
By the middle of the seventeenth century, court decisions 
and statuary acts more clearly indicate a debased status for 
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Blacks. In 1630, in the case of Re Davis, the court ordered Hugh 
Davis "to be soundly whipt before an assembly of negroes & oth­
ers for abusing himself to the dishon[o]r of God and shame of 
Christians, by defiling his body in lying with a negro . .. .  "9 Ten 
years later, in Re Sweat, the court heard the case of Robert Sweat, 
a white colonist charged with having impregnated an unnamed 
black woman. The court ordered Sweat "to do public penance 
for his offence ... getting [the] negroe woman with child" and "the 
said negro woman ... be whipt at the whipping post". The cir­
cumstances surrounding the cases of Davis and Sweat are 
unknown, but the decisions make it quite clear that "negroes" 
were regarded as separate and inferior. Like Hugh Davis, Sweat 
"defiled his body" and shamed God by having sexual relations 
with a lower form of humanity.10 
This impression is reinforced by Act X decreed by the legis­
lature in 1639 that "[a] II persons except negroes to be provided 
with arms and ammunition to be fined at pleasure of the 
Governor and the Council."11 This was the first legislative enact­
ment to mention Blacks specifically. The requirement that all 
Whites, including servants, bear arms while all Blacks, including 
free men, were forbidden to do so, reveals the continuing evolu­
tion of a distinct, and lesser, position for Blacks. 
A series of cases in the early 1640s demonstrate that black 
labor was not subject to term restrictions. In July 1640, three 
runaway slaves were caught and tried before the court. All three 
were whipped, and while the two Whites, a Dutchman and a 
Scot, had several years added to their indentures, the third, a 
black man named John Punch, was ordered to serve his "master 
or his assigns for the time of his natural life here or elsewhere." 12 
In October of the same year, another group of runaways was 
caught in a skiff on the Elizabeth River and punished similarly. 
Emmanuel, the one Black recaptured, received the same harsh 
punishments meted out to the others, with three exceptions. He 
alone received no additional years on his term of service, pre­
sumably because he was already a servant for life. He was also 
branded with an "R" on his cheek and was required to wear 
shackles for a year. 13 
The question of the heritability of enslavement rose con­
comitantly with the drift in equating blackness with slavery. 
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Several cases over the twenty-year period from the 1640s to the 
1660s concern themselves with the hereditary nature of slavery 
and the effect of white parentage on a Black 1s slave status. 
Uncertainty is definitely evident in the early legal record. The 
1641 case of John Graweere, for example, clearly suggests his 
status as a slave but reveals confusion about exactly how that sta­
tus might be transmitted to children. Graweere was a servant of 
William Evans, who allowed him to raise hogs provided that Mr. 
Evans received half of the profit. Graweere fathered a son to a 
black slave owned by Lieutenant Robert Sheppard. Mr. 
Graweere purchased his son 1s freedom from Lt. Sheppard in 
order to raise him to be a Christian "taught and exercised in the 
Church of England." After the sale, Evans asserted title to the 
child. In upholding Graweere's right to his son, the court rec­
ognized that Sheppard's claim to the boy lay in the lieutenant's 
ownership of the mother, but it also ordered that the boy would 
be free from any claim of Evans and his heirs, whose only possi­
ble right to the boy would arise from their ownership of the 
father.14 Early in the next decade, the court rejected a challenge 
to a 1652 sale, by a Virginia planter of a 10 year old black girl 
"with her issue and produce duringe her (or either of them) for 
their Life tyme" and "their Successors forever."1s This is obvi­
ously a case where children inherited their slave status from their 
mother with no thought given to the race or ownership of their 
father. 
The case of Mihill Gowen, who was freed by the will of 
Christopher Stafford, illustrates another aspect of this issue. In 
the York County court in 1657 Stafford's sister, Anne Barnhouse, 
formally renounced any claims to Gowen. She then gave a boy 
"born of the body of my negro Rosa being baptised" to Gowen. 
She referred to the boy as Gowen's "Sonne William."16 By mak­
ing the gift, Ms. Barnhouse clearly acted as if she believed that 
otherwise she would have had lawful possession of William, and 
the basis for that must have been that she owned William 1s moth­
er. 
The case of Elizabeth Key, decided in 1656, advances the 
issue of the effect of white parentage on slave status. Elizabeth 
was found by the county court to have been the child of a slave 
woman by a white man, Thomas Key. In fact, shortly after 
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Elizabeth's birth, Mr. Key had been fined "for getting his negro 
woman with Chi Ide which said Negro was the Mother of the said 
Molletto." As an adult, when about to be sold as part the estate 
of Colonel John Mottram, Ms. Key claimed her freedom on the 
basis of her birth to a free white father. This case went to the 
Virginia assembly which returned it to the county court for 
reconsideration because no one appeared before the Burgesses 
to speak against Key's petition for freedom. Despite the incon­
clusive result, the assembly's report showed that the Burgesses 
believed she was entitled to freedom. One possible ground 
behind their thinking was her acceptance of Christianity. 
Prevailing legal practices provide another possible explanation: 
Common Law held that "the Chi Id of a Woman slave begott by 
a freeman ought to bee free." The end result was that Elizabeth 
Key was declared free in Northumberland County, and then mar­
ried the white attorney who had represented her.17 
The uncertainty about the status of Blacks born from mis­
cegenous relationships was cieared up 1652 by a statute which 
provided that: "Whereas some doubts have arisen whether chil­
dren got by an Englishman upon a negro woman should be slave 
or free ... That all children born in this country shall be held 
bond or free only according to the condition of the mother ... "18 
Thousands of Blacks, including "Mulattoes," would have been 
entitled to freedom had the legislature followed the English legal 
doctrine that the status of the child was determined by the status 
of the father. 
During the same time period, when the question of race and 
slavery was reaching solution, confusion also surrounded the 
issue of the effect of Christian baptism on slave status. This was 
a vexing problem, which presented itself with some frequency, 
resulting from the pull of two competing notions. Not surpris­
ingly up until 1680, Virginia, and some other English colonies, 
often followed the English and Spanish custom of extending the 
privileges of a free person to baptized Blacks.19 For several 
decades, white Virginians were undecided whether blackness or 
Christianity was more important on the status of Blacks. Some 
Africans who had become Christians before arriving in Virginia 
were accorded a higher status than other Africans. In the same 
uneven fashion, a few of the Africans who converted after their 
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arrival in the colony also gained additional rights. Black 
Christians were allowed to testify in court and could even bring 
suit. Other Blacks could not.20 The acceptance of Christian 
baptism was a powerful symbol to white Virginians, who saw it 
as crucial evidence of the development of civility and rationali­
ty. Since these qualities were seen as incompatible with slave 
status, conversion sometimes brought manumission, or at least 
some degree of greater personal freedom. As noted, the decision 
in the case of Elizabeth Key also rests at least in part on her claim 
that she was entitled to her freedom because she was a Christian. 
In the 1667 case of Fernando, however, a black man 1s suit for 
freedom on the grounds of Christian baptism failed. This lack of 
clarity produced anxiety and a drive for resolution, reflected in 
confusion in the judicial decisions, and ultimately, in the passage 
of a law that resolved the problem.21 
In the meantime, several court cases concerned with the 
problem were adjudicated. In 1644, the General Assembly 
heard the case of Manuel, who was purchased as a "slave for 
Ever", but later became a Christian and demanded his freedom. 
The court judged that, as a Christian, Manuel was not a slave, 
and should "serve as other Christian servants do." Still, it 
ordered him to serve ten years, a longer term than white 
Christian servants were required to serve;22 the sentence reflect­
ed the pull of forces that saw all Blacks as slaves. Significantly, 
immediately after this decision, Manuel 1s owner sought com­
pensation from the government, strong evidence that there was 
an expectation that Blacks would be held in perpetual servitude. 
Again, statutory law was used to decide the matter once and 
for all, clearing up any confusion by declaring in 1667 that bap­
tism had no effect on the status of Blacks as slaves. After 
Fernando initiated his case, but before the court rendered its 
decision, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute which read in 
part: 
Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children 
that are slaves by birth, and the charity and pity of their 
owners made partakers of the blessed sacrament of 
baptism, should by virtue of their baptism be made free, 
it is enacted that baptism does not alter the condition of 
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the person as to his bondage of freedom; masters freed 
from this doubt may carefully propagate Christianity by 
permitting slaves to be admitted to that sacrament.23 
In reality through the act, slaveholders were now encour­
aged to convert their slaves, since they no longer risked any loss 
of property thereby. The assembly followed its declaration on 
baptism with a decree that non-Christian servants brought to 
colony "by shipping" were to be slaves for life.24 
Hence, although status in the first half of the seventeenth 
century was not rigidly fixed by race, the effect of the legal deci­
sions and statutory enactments of that period was to make it 
more likely that Blacks would be treated as slaves, and that once 
slaves they would remain so. The custom of holding black labor­
ers for a term of life was reflected in, as well as accepted and val­
idated by, early case decisions. Routes of escape from this con­
dition were firmly closed off by legislation in the 1660s. Any 
doubt that the law recognized slavery by the end of decade 
could be seen in a 1669 statute, An Act about the casual/ killings 
of slaves: 
Whereas the only law in force for the punishment of 
refractory servants resisting their master, mistress or 
overseer, cannot be inflicted on negroes [because the 
punishment was extension of time], Nor the obstinacy 
of many of them by other than violent meanes supprest. 
Be it enacted and declared by this grand assembly, if 
any slave resist his master ... and by the extremity of the 
correction should chance to die, that his death shall not 
be accompted Felony, but the master (or that other per­
son appointed by the master to punish him) be acquit 
from molestation, since it cannot be presumed that 
propensed malice (which alone makes murther Felony) 
should induce any man to destroy his own estate.2s 
The Cultural and Economic Environment of the 
Development of Slave Law in Virginia 
The practice of holding Blacks as slaves and the legal decisions 
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that gradually institutionalized that custom were connected to 
cultural and economic conditions that existed in England and in 
Virginia in the seventeenth century. The widespread availability 
of free land in Virginia, coupled with the boom in tobacco prices 
that lasted through the 1620s, fueled an extremely high demand 
for labor in the colony. Since land that could grow tobacco was 
abundant, the key to amassing wealth was the acquisition of a 
stable, and large, supply of labor to work that land.26 
As the demand for workers in Virginia rose steadily, planters 
increasingly turned to indentured servants to fill this demand. 
These servants arrived in Virginia bound by contracts that exact­
ed long terms of service in exchange for their transportation from 
England.27 The long periods of required service led to the devel­
opment of a market in men unlike anything seen in Britain, 
where labor contracts seldom exceeded a year. Masters in 
Virginia could freely buy and sell servants at any time for any 
period of years covered by their contracts, and servants could be 
sold without their consent.is Servants, without the desire to be 
rehired or the inclination to be pleasing, had little reason to be 
productive or conscientious or even respectful. Masters holding 
little hope or expectation of rehiring their servants for another 
term alternated between leniency and despotism with their 
workers, attempting in the former to bribe the hires and in the 
latter to extract the full measure they believed was their due. The 
latter became the norm. The Council regularly supported mas­
ters' cruelties to their servants. Probably the worst example is the 
case of Elizabeth Abbott and Elias Hinton, servants of John and 
Alice Proctor. Both servants died after receiving a series of brutal 
beatings. A witness testified that Proctor had beaten Hinton with 
a rake, and after one especially bad beating Abbott ran away to 
some neighbors who "fownd she had been sore beaten and her 
body full of sores and holes very dangerously raunkled and putri­
fied both above her wast and uppon her hips and thighs." Still, 
they returned her to her master, begging his pardon, and he wa 
apparently never punished for either death. Mi treatment wa 
thus common, and although it was constrained to a limited 
degree by the judiciary, it was generally accepted and even 
expected.29 
Labor was not the only commodity in short supply. Severe 
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food shortages were also a major problem for the Virginia 
Company and its dependents during the 1620s, as cornfields 
were neglected in favor of tobacco.3o Even after the labor 
shortage was alleviated, population growth coupled with meager 
increases in the cultivation of food crops kept prices relatively 
high. 
These economic conditions, however, did provide many 
opportunities for the most powerful men in the colony to enrich 
themselves. One of the ways they did this was to acquire most 
of the black workers that arrived in Virginia, which they took 
great pains to do. Black labor was cheaper and more valuable 
to the Virginia planters, especially as the costs of white inden­
tured servants also began to rise, simply because Blacks could be 
kept longer than white servants.31 The desire of the leading 
planters for slaves was strong, even when white labor was nei­
ther scarce nor unruly.32 The high demand for slaves in the 
British Caribbean islands, however, left few for Virginia from 
British suppliers, but some regular trade was established with the 
Dutch, and some unsuccessful attempts to go directly to Africa 
were made.33 Though only a small number of slaves trickled into 
Virginia until the Caribbean islands were stocked, the demand 
for black labor continued to increase in the mainland colony 
long before then. By 1660, Virginia had enacted a law offering 
special inducements to Dutch shippers to bring slaves to the 
colony.34 
Because it was relatively difficult to get slaves and because 
their purchase required a relatively high initial outlay of capital, 
slave owners tended to be the wealthiest, most powerful people 
in the colony.3s This economic reality can be seen even in the 
very first account of an arrival of Blacks into Virginia, John Rolfe's 
1620 letter to Sir Edwin Sandys, treasurer of the Virginia 
Company.36 These first "20. and odd Negroes" were bartered 
by the Governor of Virginia, George Yeardley, and a merchant, 
Abraham Piersey, in exchange for food, at a time of chronic food 
shortages. By 1625, these two men owned 15 of the 23 Blacks 
in the colony.37 Both also sat on the Virginia General Court. 
Demand for labor explains why Blacks were brought to 
Virginia, but not why they were enslaved, or even why, regard­
less of their social rank in Africa, they were placed on a lower 
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social stratum than that of white servants. Cultural factors, par­
ticularly English racial attitudes, help provide this explanation. 
Here, it can be seen that the underlying reason for the discrimi­
nation that took place in seventeenth-century Virginia was the 
pervasive English prejudice towards Africans that existed before 
1619. 
The Tudor-Stuart antipathy toward black Africans has been 
well documented. The evidence is fairly clear that the notion 
that Africans were fundamentally different from, and inferior to, 
Europeans arose in sixteenth-century England in response to a 
number of circumstances. England 1s insularity before the middle 
of that century and the English sudden interactions with people 
quite different from themselves in appearance and culture cou­
pled with their simultaneous discovery of the great apes and the 
emotional impact of the color black in their culture led to a per­
vasive belief that black Africans were both biologically and cul­
turally unworthy of being treated as equals. Ignorant of the his­
tory of Christianity in Africa, including its survival in 
Northeastern Africa, Englishmen asserted that Africans were not 
Christians, and their dark skin was a curse from God. They were 
strangers; they were black; they were heathens. They qualified 
to be slaves on all counts, and the prejudice against them seems 
to have been widespread in both England and America.Ja 
Thus, in the Virginia of the early and mid-seventeenth cen­
tury those who held power had both an economic need for 
cheap labor and a moral justification for treating a vulnerable 
people badly. In this context it is not surprising that the legal 
decisions made by the powerful men who sat on the court served 
to legitimize and institutionalize hereditary racial slavery. 
The Legal Environment of the Development of Slave Law 
in Virginia 
The early decision of Whites in Virginia to treat Blacks as prop­
erty rooted in English racial attitudes, the economic context of 
Virginia, and the unconstrained nature of judicial power in the 
colony, led to the development of laws designed to protect the 
slave owners 1 rights in their black property. Conciliar justice, 
swift, arbitrary, and brutal, was instrumental in creating the 
atmosphere of profound disrespect for individual liberties that 
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enabled masters to abuse white servants at will and to hold black 
servants for life. Later, as the need to regulate slavery began to 
replace the need to impose it, the Virginia legal system came to 
protect this particular type of property in much the same way all 
property was protected in England -- though the application of 
the ordinary concepts of the common law. Thus, two different 
aspects of the English legal tradition were drawn on in the cre­
ation of slavery as a legal institution. 
The development of slave law in Virginia was contempora­
neous with the development of Virginia's legal system itself. The 
1606 and 1609 charters of the Virginia Company both contain 
vague guarantees of traditional English rights for the colonists, 
but are entirely unclear as to the practical meaning of this guar­
antee. The 1606 Charter, for example, states only that inhabi-
tants of Virginia " ... shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchis-
es, and immunities ... as if they had been abiding and borne 
within this our realm of Englande .... 39 The supplemental 
instructions do little to make this any clearer. They order the 
colonial council to govern "as neare to the Common Law [of] 
England and the equity thereof as may be."40 
Nor do the English legal commentators and theorists provide 
any elucidation of the practical relationship between English 
legal doctrine and colonial justice. Blackstone includes a very 
brief discussion of these issues in his Commentaries, concluding 
only that the general claim that all English laws accompany 
colonists to an uninhabited country "must be understood with 
very many and very great restrictions." He does not, however, 
say what those restrictions might be. Otherwise, there is nearly 
total silence from the English legal community. No real theory 
of colonial jurisprudence was articulated.41 
In the absence of direction from home, then, colonial 
jurisprudence evolved on its own. The dominant explanation of 
that evolution has been that the language of the Charters trans­
ferred to Virginia the general legal framework of the mother 
country- its traditional legal customs and practices- rather 
than the entire developed body of common law principles. 
Aspects of this system were then changed, replaced or dropped 
under the influence of Virginia's economic, social, and political 
environments. A similar transformation took place in the devel-
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opment of a uniquely American body of substantive law.42 
The transfer of English law to Virginia, in this view, was a 
process of adaptation to meet colonial needs. This adaptation 
took place in a variety of ways. Sometimes change was wrought 
by deliberate dissent from English legal customs, sometimes by 
an imperfect understanding of those customs, and sometimes by 
a lack of any applicable English precedents. It is acknowledged 
that such a transition would have been halting and painful, but it 
is seen in a larger way as a logical, coherent, and essentially 
orderly process that gradually brought the principles of the com­
mon law to the colonies basically intact.43 
This view, however, ignores or at least downplays the 
actual operation of the early Virginia legal system, which bears 
almost no resemblance to its counterpart in England, and fails to 
acknowledge its powerful relationship with another, less benign, 
type of English justice that had its roots in the social disorder and 
official suppression of the lower classes in sixteenth-century 
England. The social, political, and economic turmoil of Tudor 
England was met with increasingly severe treatment for the lower 
classes who, displaced by the convulsions, were seen as viola­
tors of public order, their dislocations proof of moral failure 
rather than illustrations of the deterioration of the social fabric. 
Greater authority was given to the courts and far-reaching poor 
laws and measures against vagrancy were enacted, using com­
pulsory labor, galley servitude, and colonization as ways to deal 
with disorder.44 
Tudor methods of suppressing dissent were harshest in the 
areas farthest from London. In the northern and western hinter­
lands and on the Irish frontier, local nobles were placed in con­
trol of governing councils which had responsibility for enforcing 
justice in these areas. While these bodies were theoretically 
bound, to one degree or another by the protections of the com­
mon law, in practice they were free to ignore those restraints and 
to issue whatever summary justice they chose as long as they 
kept the unruly poor under control. Common law procedures 
designed to protect individual rights and liberties were meaning­
less.45 
In Virginia, an analogous situation existed. Whereas the 
Charters were vague about common law protections for the 
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colonists, they were quite specific in setting up a ruling council, 
which functioned as a judicial body just as powerful as the other 
conciliar courts . The council came into existence with the cre­
ation of the colony. The Company of London appointed the 
members of the council. The general court was the colony's 
highest judicial body; however, for a number of years, it shared 
jurisdiction concurrently with the legislature. Criminal cases 
were tried in whichever body convened first. After 1640, the 
civil jurisdiction of the assembly was limited primarily to appel­
late cases.46 And, in practice, the Council in Virginia was just as 
unconcerned with common law procedures as were authorities 
in England. The common law was not the only law in England, 
and on the frontiers summary justice was the rule.47 
Examples of the unconstrained nature of judicial power in 
early Virginia are abundant and are found in every period from 
the First Charter through the Third and continuing well after 
Virginia became a Royal Colony. The reported cases demon­
strate a complete lack of concern on the part of the court for indi­
vidual liberties, procedural protections, or even jurisdiction. 
Clearly, the agenda of the Council acting as court was to control 
the potentially unruly lower classes who made up Virginia's 
laboring population and to guard the power and wealth of its 
members. 
For example, in May, 1624, one Richard Barnes was 
accused of uttering "base and detracting" speeches against the 
governor. The court ordered that he "be disarmed, and have his 
armes broken and his tongue bored through with an awl. [He] 
shall pass through a guard of 40 men and shalbe butted by every 
one of them, and at the head of the troope kicked downe and 
footed out of the fort: that he shalbe banished out of James Cittye 
and the lland, that he shall not be capable of any priviledge of 
freedome of the countrye, and that (before he goe out of the 
lland) he shall put in suretyes of 200 bond for the good behav­
ior."48 
At about the same time, members of the Council became 
aware of grumblings of discontent against the execution of a 
shipmaster named Richard Cornish for sodomy. Edward Nevel! 
encountered Cornish's brother on a ship off the coast of Canada 
and voiced his dissatisfaction with the execution. The Council 
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learned of the conversation and charged Mr. Newell with blas­
phemy. For this offense, over which it certainly lacked jurisdic­
tion, the court sentenced Nevell to "stand on the pillory with a 
paper one his head shewinge the cause of his offence ... and to 
loose both his Ears and to serve the Colony for A yeere, And for­
ever to be incapable to be a ffree man of the countrey."49 
In handing out punishments the court did not hesitate to 
consider the economic advantage of its powerful members. For 
example, his criticism of the same execution got Thomas Hatch, 
a servant whose seven-year term was almost finished, a sentence 
of a whipping and the loss of one ear. The court also ordered that 
"his service to Sir George Yeardley for seven yeeres shal begain 
from the present dye."so When Luke Eden sought payment of a 
debt owed him by Sir Edwin Sandys, he wound up "laid neck 
and heels" for his "unreverent speche" and in debt to Sandys for 
two hundred pounds of tobacco.s1 
The only justice in Virginia, then, was the unmitigated 
authority of the Council, which was not especially concerned 
with protecting anyone's traditional rights, much less those of the 
common laborers and servants who came before them. The con­
text of the development of the early law of slavery was thus 
deeply authoritarian. In this atmosphere of unconstrained legal 
authority the councillors made their decisions concerning the 
customary practices of slavery. Lack of respect for the rights of 
the lower classes, cultural contempt for Blacks, and economic 
self-interest combined to produce case law, and ultimately legis­
lation, that reinforced the institution of slavery at every turn, lack 
of English legal precedents not withstanding. 
A clear example of the operation of this process is found in 
the development of the legal rule that the status of a black child 
descends from its mother.s2 Many interpreters have explained 
this rule by arguing that as cases concerning the status of chil­
dren with black mothers and white fathers came before the 
court, the court first looked to English law for precedents. 
Although the general rule of English law of status is that status is 
derived from the father, there is no category of "slave" to be 
found in that body of law, and, rather than apply the general 
principle to a slightly different circumstance, this argument con­
tends that the jurists on the Virginia council turned to continen-
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tal civil law codes, which addressed slavery directly. Here they 
supposedly found an answer to the legal issue raised by misce­
genation that was directly on point: the doctrine of partus 
sequiter ventrum -that the status of a child with mixed slave and 
free parentage follows the status of the mother. This, then, was 
the law that was eventually adopted in Virginia, in 1662, after the 
initial confusion over the issue. The statute's wording that 
"Children got by an Englishman upon a Negro woman shall be 
bond or free according to condition of the mother, ... " failed to 
address the reality that black men fathered children with white 
Christian women. In fact, the child of a white woman and black 
male became a servant or slave according to the status of 
father.s3 
It is extremely unlikely, however, that the source of partus 
sequiterventrum is the continent. Its true source is no legal doc­
trine at all but rather is the same logic of domination by force 
that guided all of the court's decision-making in this early peri­
od. Neither the councillors nor, later, the Burgesses were 
equipped to make their way through arcane English status law or 
complex foreign civil codes, even if they had access to then, 
which they probably did not.54 The real legal problem was that 
the familiar legal doctrine that status derives from the father 
would not work to maintain a growing system of racially based 
chattel slavery. 
The logic of slavery required that the slave be reified, treat­
ed as a thing, not as a person, and the decision to make slavery 
descend from the mother makes the most sense when seen as a 
matter of determining the ownership of something rather than 
the status of someone. Given the social, racial, and economic 
context of seventeenth-century Virginia, once the custom of 
holding Blacks as slaves had become established, it must have 
seemed natural to the wealthy, powerful men who controlled the 
colony and the court, to conceptualize a slave woman as a piece 
of livestock. And English law had clear rules about livestock. If 
a I itter of pigs belongs to the owner of the sow, then obviously a 
black woman's child belongs to its mother's master. That this 
outcome would also increase their personal wealth as well as 
avoid complicated and unpleasant personal entanglements 
could not have escaped the decision-makers' notice either. 
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Thus once it was established that concern for the property 
rights of slaveholders was the key factor in determining legal 
doctrine, there were simple, well-known rules available to pro­
tect and preserve those interests. English law contained in the 
common law one of the most developed and effective schemes 
for the protection of property ever devised, and there was 
absolutely nothing to prevent the court from applying it to 
Blacks-ss 
The legal institutionalization of slavery, then, was not an 
aberration or an exception to the general pattern of early legal 
development in Virginia. Once racism and greed had impelled 
the practice, the unrestrained conciliar judicial system, with its 
utter disregard for the individual liberties of the lower classes, 
permitted it to continue, and the common law provided the 
means to regulate it and to close the loopholes left by custom. 
English legal tradition thus forms the basis of both the later, more 
developed law of slavery and the society created by and for 
white Virginians. The institution that favors freedom in one con­
text can also be the means of the continued oppression of an 
entire ethnic group. The foundation stone of liberty can be used 
as the instrument of complete loss of liberty. The English tradi­
tion of representative government, a bulwark against tyranny, 
enabled the Virginia legislature, full of slaveholders, to complete 
the job begun by the early court and completely strip Blacks of 
their legal humanity. Between 1680 and 1682 the legislature 
completed the task, enacting the first major slave codes. It not 
only synthesized the judicial rulings and statutory provisions of 
the previous four decades but also introduced others incorporat­
ing some of the strict customs and traditions that had developed 
to control Virginia's indentured servants. Had it chosen to do so, 
Virginia could have referenced developments in England. Two 
years before the centennial of the 1569 Cartwrighf56 decision, in 
which it held that slavery was inconsistent with English tradi­
tions, the English court, in Butts v. Penny,s7 ruled that black slav­
ery was legal within England. 
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